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Abstract
Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers
& acquisitions, in contrast to green￿eld investments, might have an adverse e⁄ect on
domestic ￿rms and consumers. However, given that domestic assets are su¢ ciently
scarce, we identify a preemption e⁄ect and an asset complementarity e⁄ect, which
imply that the acquisition price is signi￿cantly higher than the domestic seller￿ s
pro￿ts. Moreover, we show that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be
su¢ ciently e¢ cient when using the domestic assets, otherwise rivals will expand their
business, thereby making the acquisition unpro￿table. Consequently, restricting
cross-border M&As may also hurt consumers.
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In the last decade, we have witnessed a strong trend of investment liberalizations in devel-
oping and transition countries. Despite the generally welcoming attitude towards inward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among investment liberalizing countries1, concerns are
raised about the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on develop-
ment.2 One such concern is that underdeveloped equity markets or ￿nancial crises allow
foreign entrants to acquire domestic ￿rms at ￿too low￿a price. There is also a concern
that cross-border M&As, in contrast to green￿eld FDI (investment in new capital), do
not increase the productive capacity and might lead to lower consumer welfare and lay-
o⁄s.3 Indeed, some countries restrict the right of foreign individuals and ￿rms to acquire
domestic ￿rms, or apply special restrictions to foreign ￿rms in certain industries.4
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact on the host country of di⁄erent
liberalization programs with respect to cross-border M&As, by comparing two di⁄erent
liberalization programs: (i) allowing green￿eld investments but not cross-border M&As
(referred to as a discriminatory policy) or (ii) allowing green￿eld investments and cross-
border M&As (referred to as a non-discriminatory policy).
1 In the early 1990s, the value of inward FDI in developing countries was about $50 billion
and in the late 1990s, it exceeded $200 billion. FDI today accounts for a large share of capital
formation in these countries, and FDI in￿ ows as a percentage of private capital formation in all
industries have increased from 6.7 % in 1990 to 17.7% in 1998. The corresponding values for
Central and Eastern Europe were 0.79% in 1990 and 16.2 % in 1998, see WIR 2000.
2 The value of cross-border M&As in developing countries has been growing rapidly since the
mid-1990s and constitutes about one third of the FDI in￿ ows in this period. The developing
countries￿share of world cross-border M&As increased from 2 % in 1987 to almost 9 % in 1999
(WIR, 2000).
3 WIR 2000.
4 This is the case in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, for example. But the practise of
countries in this respect has also changed over time. For instance, by May 1998, restrictions
on foreign acquisitions of domestic shares in the stock market, and restrictions on M&As by
foreigners in the Republic of Korea had been abolished. However, the new investment policy still
favors green￿eld investment through, for instance, di⁄erent tax treatments of M&A investments
(WIR, 2000).
2To this end, we make the following distinction between entry by acquisition and green-
￿eld entry: the domestic assets are in scarce supply and the price is determined in an
auction acquisition game. The limited availability of these assets may be associated with
the acquired ￿rm having privileged access to the distribution system, ownership of land or
permits, knowledge of the speci￿c characteristics of the local market, locally well-known
brand names, or assets already in the market allowing early entry.5 The variable cost of
green￿eld investment (new investments) is, on the other hand, assumed to be ￿xed. This
is motivated by the fact that the supply of inputs (labor and capital) used in these invest-
ments to a large extent consists of inputs used in many other industries in the economy
and the investor in a particular industry could then be seen as a price taker.
To capture these aspects, we consider a model where a domestic ￿rm is initially located
in the market in the host country, H. There are also several multinational enterprises
(MNEs) located in the world market. The market in the host country will now be exposed
to international competition. In the ￿rst stage, the MNEs might acquire the domestic
￿rm￿ s assets under the non-discriminatory policy, whereas no cross-border acquisition is
allowed under the discriminatory policy. In the second stage, ￿rms have the option of
investing in new assets in country H. New investments are labelled green￿eld investments
for non-acquiring MNEs, and sequential investments for the acquiring MNE (if a sale
occurs) and the domestic ￿rm (if no sale occurs). Finally, in the third stage, ￿rms compete
in oligopoly fashion in the product market in country H.
It is straightforward to identify circumstances, not modeled in this paper though,
under which MNEs might acquire domestic ￿rms at ￿too low￿a price when bargaining
between the acquiring MNE and the seller takes place in isolation. The MNE may then, for
instance, use informational or ￿nancial advantages in the bargaining, thereby acquiring the
domestic ￿rm at a price substantially below its ￿ market value￿ . In contrast, we show that
5 This seems to be in line with the discussions in the business literature, where it is claimed
that the main motivation for choosing M&As over green￿eld investments is that the buyer then
quickly obtains unique assets (WIR 2000).
3the acquisition price is higher than the domestic ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts under the discriminatory
policy when there are several potential MNE-buyers due to the bidding competition over
the domestic target ￿rm.
The ￿rst reason is a pro￿t asset complementarity e⁄ect. It is likely that the domestic
assets are more e¢ ciently used when transferred from domestic to foreign ownership, since
MNEs are typically ￿rms with strong ￿rm-speci￿c assets in terms of strong technology,
know-how of marketing, organization etc.6 These ￿rm-speci￿c assets could be combined
with the domestic ￿rm￿ s locally strong assets, such as distribution network, access to
speci￿c assets like permits, etc. If this asset complementarity e⁄ect is su¢ ciently large,
a surplus is created when the domestic assets are transferred to an MNE: However, due
to the bidding competition between the MNEs for buying these assets, this entire surplus
is captured by the target ￿rm, i.e. the domestic ￿rm. The second e⁄ect is a preemption
e⁄ect, which is only present in oligopolistic interaction. If the domestic assets are more
e¢ ciently used by an MNE, it is likely that the pro￿t of a non-acquiring MNE will decrease
when the assets are transferred from domestic to foreign ownership, which implies that
the MNE gains from preventing other MNEs from obtaining the assets. Once more, due
to the bidding competition between MNEs, this entire surplus is captured by the domestic
￿rm. Note that this second e⁄ect implies that the selling domestic ￿rm captures a larger
surplus than the surplus created by its buyer as compared to the situation where the assets
would exit. This is due to the fact that the seller is not only paid for selling its assets to
the acquiring MNE but also for not selling to a rival MNE.
Moreover, it is shown that under the discriminatory policy, the domestic ￿rm might be
forced out of the market due to competition from the potentially more e¢ cient green￿eld
entering MNEs. However, the domestic assets might be valuable for the MNEs and a
cross-border M&A would take place if allowed. A restrictive cross-border M&A policy
6 Indeed, FDI is considered to be an important channel for transferring new technology and
knowledge into developing and transition countries (see, Caves (1996) or Markusen (1995)).
Lipsey (2000) argues that, more generally, one of the major functions of FDI is to transfer assets
from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient owners and managers.
4might thus cause the exit of domestic producers, i.e. an exit without any compensation.
Consequently, by allowing cross-border M&A, domestic owners can actually capture part of
MNE industry rents, i.e. rents that under a discriminatory policy would only be captured
by MNEs, and which can be used in di⁄erent sectors in the domestic economy.
The bidding competition over Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo (Banespa), the seventh
largest bank in Brazil, is an example where the competition between di⁄erent MNEs over
strategic important assets seems to have generated large rents for the selling domestic ￿rm.
In November 2000, Banco Santander Central Hispanio (BSCH) won a controlling minority
stake in Banespa, in competition with several other large banks, including its Spanish rival
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). According to Business Week (April 23, 2001):
￿It cost an astronomical $3.55 billion, but it put BSCH back on top￿(before BBVA -
authors￿comment). The assets of Banespa were considered to be strategically valuable, as
indicated by the following quote ￿ Anyone who can add Banespa to their existing structure
will take a gigantic leap forward,￿says Elio Duarte, director of institutional relations at
the Brazilian subsidiary of Britain￿ s HSBC Holdings PLC, one of the nine banks quali￿ed
to take part in the auction.￿(Business Week, November 20, 2000). According to Business
Week (November 20, 2000), this means that ￿ ...bidders will pay a premium not just to get
their hands on Banespa but also to stop rivals from doing so.￿
The second concern about cross-border M&As addressed in this paper is that, in con-
trast to green￿eld FDI, they do not increase the productive capacity in the country and
thus, are not bene￿cial to consumers and labor. We show that the amount of productive
capacity in the market might, indeed, be lower under the non-discriminatory policy, due to
the acquisition of the domestic ￿rm. Thus, welfare decreasing acquisitions can take place
in equilibrium, i.e. acquisitions by foreign owners that will use the domestic assets less
e¢ ciently and acquire the domestic assets for market power reasons. However, it is also
shown that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be su¢ ciently e¢ cient when
using the domestic assets, i.e. there is a lower limit on how ine¢ cient a foreign acquirer
5can be.7
To see this, note that an acquisition mainly driven by the desire to eliminate a rival to
be able to increase product market prices will imply that rivals in the market will have an
incentive to expand their business. However, this reaction by the rivals￿will reduce the
pro￿tability of the acquisition. Hence, the acquiring ￿rm must be su¢ ciently e¢ cient in
using the domestic assets to counter an expansionary reaction by its rivals to make the
acquisition pro￿table. This implies that there is a counteracting e⁄ect to the concentration
e⁄ect (the domestic ￿rm being bought out), which tends to decrease total capital in the
industry, namely an investment e¢ ciency e⁄ect which tends to increase the total capital
in the industry.
Using a Linear-Quadratic Model with asset complementarities and endogenous capi-
tal investment, we then illustrate that the amount of productive capacity in the market
will be higher under the non-discriminatory policy when the asset complementarity be-
tween domestic and foreign assets is su¢ ciently high and consequently, consumers and
labor also gain when foreign acquisitions are allowed. The reason is that when the assets￿
complementarity is high, the acquiring ￿rm will become more aggressive in its investment
behavior and increase its sequential investment to such an extent that total investment in
the market increases, despite the reduced green￿eld investments by non-acquiring MNEs
following the acquirer￿ s expansion. Conversely, it is also in such situations, with large
sequential investments by the acquiring MNE and repressed investments by non-acquiring
MNEs, where the bidding competition over the bene￿ts of becoming a strong acquirer and
avoiding becoming a weak non-acquirer leads to a substantially higher acquisition price
than the domestic ￿rm￿ s reservation price. Consequently, we demonstrate that asset com-
plementarities in acquisitions and the associated dynamic investment e⁄ects are important
for determining the welfare e⁄ects of a cross-border M&As.
The related theoretical literature on FDI and MNEs is surveyed in e.g.Markusen (1995).
7 Evidence from developing countries shows that sequential investment after cross-border
M&As can be sizeable (WIR (2000).
6This literature seems to largely focus on green￿eld investment, even though some results
are not speci￿c to the mode of entry. But there is no systematic analysis of the di⁄erences
in welfare rami￿cations of allowing di⁄erent modes of entry such as green￿eld investment
and/or acquisition of assets already in the market.8 There is also a small theoretical litera-
ture addressing welfare aspects of cross-border mergers in international oligopoly markets.9
But this literature typically treats the green￿eld investment alternative cursory. This pa-
per can be said to bridge these two bodies of literature, by analyzing a model that treats
both entry modes much more symmetrically.10 In this model both the acquisition price
and the size of new investments (green￿eld and sequential investments) are endogenously
determined. This enables us to determine the long run e⁄ects of allowing cross-border
mergers and acquisitions, that is, we also take into account the implications of merger
regime for the dynamic investments (green￿eld and sequential investments). In the policy
debate, these e⁄ects have often been suggested to be very signi￿cant, but they have so far
been neglected in the economic literature.
The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium owner-
ship structure. Section 4.1 studies the e⁄ects on producer surplus of the di⁄erent speci￿ed
merger policies, whereas Section 4.2 studies the e⁄ects on investments and aggregate cap-
ital levels. In Section 4.3, more speci￿c results are derived in a Linear-Quadratic Model
with asset complementarities and endogenous capital investment. Section 5 is an extension
section where we examine e⁄ects of endogenous entry and exit, and e⁄ects of having more
domestic ￿rms in the host market. Section 6 concludes.
8 See Markusen (1997) for a study of the e⁄ects of investment liberalization on FDI.
9 This literature includes papers by, for example, Falvey (1998), Head and Reis (1997), Horn
and Persson (2001a), Lommerud, Straume and Sorgard (2004), and Neary (2003) and Norb￿ck
and Persson (2004).
10 Exceptions are Mattoo, Olarrega, and Saggi (2004 and Klimenko and Saggi (2005). They
study how entry mode a⁄ects welfare in markets where foreign technology transfers are possible.
However, by using a framework with only one foreign ￿rm they abstract from the competitive
bidding over the domestic ￿rm which is central in our approach.
72. The Model
Consider a host country, H, where the market has previously been served by a single
domestic ￿rm, denoted d, possessing one unit of domestic assets, denoted ￿ k. This market
will now be exposed to international competition11.
We assume there to be M MNEs in the world market. The MNEs do not initially
have any assets in Country H, but might now invest. The interaction takes place in three
stages. In the ￿rst stage, the MNEs might acquire the domestic ￿rm￿ s assets under the
non-discriminatory policy. Under the discriminatory policy, no acquisitions are allowed.
In the second stage, ￿rms can invest in new assets in country H. Finally, in the third stage,
￿rms compete in oligopoly fashion in country H.12
The next sections describe the product market interaction, the green￿eld investment
game, and the acquisition game.
2.1. Period three: product market interaction
he ￿rm pro￿ts will depend on the distribution of asset ownership, given from the investment
game in period 2, and the acquisition game in period 1. To capture this, we will work
with the following notation: Let the set of ￿rms in the industry be I = fd;1;2;::Mg, and
let the set of (potential) ownerships of the domestic assets, k0, be L = fd;1;2;::Mg. The
asset ownership structure K = (kd;km1;:::;kmM) speci￿es the asset ownership of each ￿rm.
11 There are di⁄erent reasons why the market is open to international investments now. The
country might be investment liberalizing, the international expansion of MNEs might be a natural
step in the life cycle of a product or stem from increasing local demand, or the administrative
costs of cross-border acquisitions and green￿eld entry may have been reduced in the globalization
process.
12 The choice of timing between the acquisition and the green￿eld investment is not obvious
in a general setting. In this particular application, however, it seems natural for the acquisition
decision to be made before the green￿eld decision, since the assets for sale already exist in the
market and entering green￿eld requires the construction of a new plant, which is usually time
consuming.
8The ￿rst entry refers to ￿rm d￿ s asset holdings, the second to MNE 1￿ s assets holdings,
etc.
￿i(x;￿;l) denotes the product market pro￿t of ￿rm i, where x =(xd;xm1;:::;xmM) is
the vector of actions taken by ￿rms in the product market interaction in period three,
￿ = (￿d;￿m1;:::;￿mM) denotes the vector of investments in new assets from period two and
l denotes the ownership of the domestic assets, given from the acquisition game in period
one.
We are now set to describe optimal behavior in the product market interaction. Given
the investments in period two, ￿, and the ownership of the domestic assets given from
period one, l, ￿rm i chooses an action xi 2 R+ to maximize its period-three product market
pro￿t, denoted ￿i(xi;x￿i : ￿;l), where x￿i is the set of actions taken by i￿ s rivals. We may
consider the action xi as setting a quantity or a price, as will be shown in later sections.
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+: (2.1)
From (2.1), we can de￿ne a reduced-form product market pro￿t for a ￿rm i, taking as
given the ownership l of the domestic assets ￿ k and the vector of new investments ￿, as
￿i (￿;l) ￿ ￿i(x￿
i (￿;l);x￿
￿i (￿;l);￿;l).
2.2. Stage two: investment in new assets
In stage two, ￿rm i invests in new assets ￿i, given the ownership l of the domestic assets,
￿ k, determined in the acquisition game in period one. This investment can be in capacity,
R&D or marketing, for instance. Firm i makes its choice ￿i 2 R+ to maximize the
reduced-form product market pro￿t, ￿i (￿;l), which we rewrite as ￿i (￿i;￿￿i : l), where
￿￿i denotes investments in new assets by i￿ s rivals. We assume there to exist a unique
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9This allows us to de￿ne ￿i(l) ￿ ￿i(￿￿ (l);l) ￿ ￿h(x￿(￿￿ (l));￿￿ (l);l)) as a reduced-form
pro￿t function for ￿rm i under ownership l, encompassing the ￿rms￿optimal actions in
period three, x￿, and optimal investments in new assets in period two, ￿￿. We here assume
￿i(l) to be strictly positive, an assumption which will be relaxed in Section 5.1.
The assumption that MNEs 1;2;::M are symmetric before the acquisition takes place
implies that we need only distinguish between two types of ownerships; domestic ownership
(l = d) and foreign (MNE) ownership (l = m). A change from domestic to foreign
ownership might imply a di⁄erent use of the domestic assets, ￿ k. We de￿ne ￿ > 0 as a
measure of the complementarity between the domestic assets ￿ k and MNEs￿￿rm-speci￿c
assets, assuming the ￿ e⁄ective size￿under foreign ownership to be ￿￿ k. MNEs are typically
leading ￿rms in their respective industries and possess ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge in terms
of technology or know-how of organization of production and marketing (see Markusen
(1995) and Caves (1995)). It is likely that at least some of this knowledge is transferred
under a change of ownership, resulting in a more e¢ cient use of the local assets, ￿ k. This
corresponds to a ￿ substantially larger than one in the model.13
We can then distinguish between two types of asset ownership structures: K(m) and
K(d):
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Note that there are three types of ￿rms of which to keep track, h = fd;A;Gg, i.e. the
domestic ￿rm (d), an acquiring MNE (A) and non-acquiring MNEs (G). The non-acquiring
MNEs will be referred to as green￿eld entrants (since they do not possess any acquired
assets ￿ k and only invest in new assets, ￿￿
G). The ￿rst entry in K(l) shows the asset
ownership of the domestic ￿rm, d, the second entry is the asset ownership of the potentially
acquiring MNE (MNE 1), and the remaining entries show the asset ownership of the
13 There are many studies con￿rming that technologies and knowledge are transferred to host-
countries through FDI (see Caves 1995).
10symmetric non-acquiring MNEs, i.e. the green￿eld entrants). Note that under domestic
ownership, there are M MNEs that invest green￿eld, whereas under MNE ownership, there
is one acquiring MNE and M ￿1 non-acquiring MNEs investing green￿eld. Note also that
￿rm d does not invest in new assets when selling its assets, ￿ k:14
A change in ownership of existing domestic assets ￿ k from domestic to foreign ownership










￿ 0, h = fd;Gg:
Assumption 1 then states that an increase in the complementarity parameter, ￿, in-
creases the acquirer￿ s pro￿t, whereas the pro￿t for a non-acquirer (i.e. green￿eld investor)
decreases. These pro￿t e⁄ects may emerge from direct e⁄ects on productivity, or by in-
directly a⁄ecting ￿rms￿optimal actions in the period-one product market game (x￿), or
a⁄ecting these actions by a⁄ecting ￿rms￿investment in new assets in period two (￿￿).
The size of these e⁄ects depends on the strength of the complementarities between MNEs￿
￿rm-speci￿c assets and the domestic assets. For example, the combination of an MNE￿ s
strong brand name and the acquired ￿rm￿ s knowledge of the market or strength in distri-
bution may provide the acquiring MNE with a strong market position. If the brand name
of the domestic assets is locally very strong, the strategic value of the assets will also be
high. Or, if the domestic assets are sold at an early stage, the acquirer may gain a strong
￿rst-mover advantage, thereby building up a dominant position in the product market.15
This set-up and this assumption are compatible with several di⁄erent investment and
oligopoly models: the model by Neary (2002) presented in Section 4.3 and with a version
14 We take this assumption to highlight the e⁄ects of the domestic ￿rm being eliminated from
the competition in the market. However, allowing the domestic ￿rm to also invest does not
change the results, given that it is su¢ ciently less e¢ cient in investing in new assets, which
should be reasonable, given the ￿rm-speci￿c assets possessed by MNEs.
15 As a speci￿c example, in the retail industry, MNEs acquire local retail chains and combine
their advantages of global sourcing with the advantages of the established distribution network.
As Green￿eld entry does not have this advantage, and it takes more time to build local assets,
an acquiring MNE is at an advantage. While having the initial possession over the distribution
network, a domestic ￿rm lacks the advantage of global sourcing.
11of that model with Bertrand competition in di⁄erentiated goods, and with the Perry and
Porter (1985) oligopoly model, preceded by an investment game into lumpy investment.
2.3. Stage one: the acquisition game
To focus on the bidding competition among MNEs as the determinant of the equilibrium
buyer, we assume that ￿rm d cannot make a bid on the MNEs. This assumption might be
motivated by the domestic owner being ￿nancially weaker or lacking the competence to
e¢ ciently run the larger business. Moreover, it is assumed that MNEs cannot make bids
on each other￿ s ￿rms, which might be supported in two basic ways in a full merger model.
One is to assume the pro￿t of a merged entity to be su¢ ciently small to imply that no
merger takes place between the MNEs.16 The second possibility would be to assume that
mergers between MNEs would not be permitted by the competition authorities.
The acquisition process is depicted as an auction where M MNEs simultaneously post
bids and the domestic ￿rm then either accepts or rejects these bids. Each MNE announces
a bid, bi, for the domestic ￿rm. b = (b1;::bi::;bM) 2 RM is the vector of these bids.
Following the announcement of b, the domestic ￿rm may be sold to one of the MNEs at
the bid price, or remain in the ownership of ￿rm d. If more than one bid is accepted, the
bidder with the highest bid obtains the domestic assets. If there is more than one MNE
with such a bid, each such MNE obtains the assets with equal probability. The acquisition
is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest amount,
", chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if " is added or subtracted.
We now turn to the ￿rms￿valuations of the domestic ￿rm￿ s assets, ￿ k. There are three
di⁄erent valuations which need to be considered:
￿ vmm is the value for an MNE of obtaining ￿ k, when a rival MNE would otherwise
16 For instance, it has been shown by Kamien and Zang (1990) that the hold up problem in
merger formation might lead to no merger taking place in equilibrium, if the initial number of
￿rms is su¢ ciently large. Moreover, mergers might be non-pro￿table, since the costs associ-
ated with mergers can be substantial, for example due to problems of fusing di⁄erent company
cultures.
12obtain ￿ k. The ￿rst term shows the pro￿t when possessing ￿ k. The second term shows
the pro￿t if a rival MNE obtains ￿ k, in which case the MNE invests green￿eld.
vmm = ￿A(m) ￿ ￿G(m) (2.5)
￿ vmd is the value for an MNE of obtaining ￿ k, when the domestic ￿rm would otherwise
keep them. The pro￿t for an MNE of not obtaining assets ￿ k is di⁄erent in this case,
due to the change of identity of the ￿rm who would otherwise obtain the assets.
vmd = ￿A(m) ￿ ￿G(d) (2.6)
￿ vd is the value for the domestic ￿rm of obtaining ￿ k. By assumption, ￿d(m) = 0 and
thus:
vd = ￿d(d): (2.7)
3. The equilibrium ownership structure
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). The game
is solved by backward induction. In period three, ￿rms optimize given the outcome in
the acquisition stage and the investment stage, where we have assumed a unique Nash
equilibrium x￿ to exist in product market actions. In period two, ￿rms invest optimally,
given the outcome in the acquisition stage, where we have assumed there to exist a unique
Nash equilibrium denoted ￿￿ in investments. In period one, the ￿rms￿bidding behavior is
dependent on the relation between their own valuation of obtaining assets ￿ k and all other
￿rms￿valuations of obtaining these assets. Since MNEs are symmetric, valuations vmm;
vmd and vd can be ordered in six di⁄erent ways, as shown in table 3.1. These inequalities
are useful for solving the model and illustrating the results. We can state the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price are described
in table 3.1:
13Proof. See the Appendix.
Table 3.1: The equilibrium ownership structure and acquisition price.
Inequality: De￿nition: Ownership structure: Acquisition price:
I1 : vmm > vmd > vd K(m) vmm
I2 : vmm > vd > vmd K(m) or K(d) vmm under K(m)
I3 : vmd > vmm > vd K(m) vmm
I4 : vmd > vd > vmm K(m) vd
I5 : vd > vmm > vmd K(d) .
I6 : vd > vmd > vmm K(d) .
Lemma 1 shows that when one of the inequalities I1; I3, or I4 holds, ￿ k is obtained
by one of the MNEs. Under I1 and I3, the acquiring MNE pays the acquisition price
A = vmm, and A = vd under I4. When I5 or I6 holds, the domestic ￿rm keeps its assets.
When I2 holds, there exist multiple equilibria.17 In the next sections, we shall explore the
policy implications of these ￿ndings.
4. Merger policy
Despite the generally welcoming attitude towards inward FDI among investment liberaliz-
ing countries, concerns are raised about the impact of cross-border M&As on development.
Arguments have been put forward, indicating that ￿nancial crises allow foreign entrants
to acquire domestic ￿rms at ￿too low￿a price or that cross-border M&As do not increase
productive capacity. We address these issues by comparing two government policies: (i) A
discriminatory policy which does not allow for cross-border M&As (henceforth denoted the
17 An equilibrium where ￿rm d keeps the assets and no MNE posts a bid above vd. There is
also an equilibrium where one of the MNE￿ s obtains the assets at a price vmm ￿ " and another
MNE posts the second highest bid at vmm ￿ 2".
14D-policy), and (ii) a non-discriminatory policy allowing for cross-border M&As (henceforth
denoted the ND-policy).
The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As and market structures in an interna-
tional oligopoly is typically made by comparing the sum of domestic consumer surplus
and domestic pro￿ts in di⁄erent market structures. We follow this approach, but add the
sales price of ￿rm d￿ s assets into the domestic welfare measure, when the domestic assets
are sold. It follows that the ND- and D-policies only di⁄er when an MNE acquires the do-
mestic assets k0 under the ND-policy. Thus, let PS(l) and CS(l) denote the producer and
consumer surplus when the ownership of k0 is l = (d;m) and let welfare under ownership
l be W(l) = PS(l) + CS(l): De￿ning the di⁄erence in welfare W ND￿D = W(m) ￿ W(d),
and rearranging terms, we obtain:
W
ND￿D = [S
￿ ￿ vd] + [CS(m) ￿ CS(d)], (4.1)
if an acquisition occur under the ND-policy. The ￿rst term in (4.15) captures the di⁄erence
in producer surplus and the second term captures the di⁄erence in consumer surplus
between the two policies.
4.1. Foreign acquisition and the acquisition price
Let us ￿rst address the issue of whether foreign entrants acquire domestic ￿rms at ￿too
low￿a price by comparing the domestic producer surplus under the discriminatory and
non-discriminatory policy. It directly follows that if the assets are sold, the price is higher
than the reservation price, i.e. A ￿ vd = ￿d(d). However, as shown in Lemma 1, the
acquisition price will be the maximum of vmm and vd, and it may thus be substantially
higher than the domestic ￿rm￿ s pro￿t under the discriminatory policy, for two reasons. To
illustrate this, note that under I1-I3, if an acquisition take place, the acquisitions price is
equal to vmm. The di⁄erence between the acquisition price, A, and the domestic ￿rm￿ s
15reservation price, vd, can then be rewritten as:
A￿vd = vmm ￿ vd
= [￿A(m) ￿ ￿G(d) ￿ ￿d(d)] + [￿G(d)￿￿G(m)]. (4.2)
The ￿rst term in (4.2) is the asset transfer e⁄ect, which includes a rival elimination e⁄ect,
since there will be one ￿rm less in the host market. However, this e⁄ect alone may
not generate a surplus. As argued above, it is also likely that the domestic assets are
more e¢ ciently used when transferred from domestic to foreign ownership. If this asset
complementarity e⁄ect is su¢ ciently large, this will lead to a surplus when the assets are
transferred to an acquiring MNE, i.e., ￿A(m) ￿ ￿G(d) ￿ ￿d(d) > 0: Due to the bidding
competition between the MNEs over the domestic assets, this entire surplus is captured
by the target ￿rm, i.e. the domestic ￿rm. The second term in (4.2) is the preemption
e⁄ect.18 The pro￿t of a non-acquiring MNE will decrease when the domestic assets are
transferred from domestic to foreign ownership, ￿G(d) > ￿G(m), if the domestic assets
are used su¢ ciently more e¢ ciently by an MNE. This implies that an MNE then gains
from preventing another MNE from obtaining the assets. Once more, due to the bidding
competition between the MNEs, this entire surplus is captured by the domestic ￿rm.
Consequently, the producer surplus may be higher, and possibly substantially higher,
under the ND-policy.
Moreover, by di⁄erentiating (4.2) in the complementarity parameter ￿; and using As-













The sales premium, i.e. the sales price net of the domestic pro￿t under the restrictive
policy, is thus increasing in ￿ for two reasons: First, the pro￿t for the acquirer increases
in ￿ (the asset complementarity e⁄ect), which increases the acquisition price. Second, the
18 Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) and Horn and Persson (2001b) have identi￿ed this e⁄ect in
merger formation models without green￿eld investment.
16pro￿t of a non-acquirer decreases in ￿ (the preemption e⁄ect), since the non-acquirer will
then face a stronger competitor in the product market. This implies that the willingness
to pay - and thus the acquisition price - increases even further. To summarize:
Proposition 1. (i) The non-discriminatory policy leads to a higher, and possibly signif-
icantly higher, domestic producer surplus. (ii) The sales premium, i.e. the sales price net
of the domestic pro￿t under the restrictive policy, is non-decreasing and increasing for
some parameter values, when the complementarity between the domestic assets and the
MNE￿ s ￿rm-speci￿c assets ￿ increases.
In conclusion, due to the asset complementarity e⁄ect and the preemption e⁄ects, we
have found that when a foreign ￿rm acquires a domestic ￿rm, the acquisition price may
signi￿cantly exceed the pro￿t the domestic ￿rm might attain when keeping the domestic
assets. Consequently, it is possible that forbidding cross-border acquisitions could lead to
a loss of producer surplus.19
4.2. Foreign acquisitions and the investment pattern
The second concern over cross-border acquisitions addressed in this paper is that, in con-
trast to green￿eld FDI (i.e. pure new (plant) investment), they do not increase the pro-
ductive capacity. Green￿eld investments are believed to exert larger positive externalities
on the rest of the economy by, for instance, strengthening product market competition,
thereby leading to large technology spillovers, or educating labor. Consequently, a better
understanding of how foreign acquisitions a⁄ect the investment pattern seems warranted.
19 Note that the results derived in this section would also hold if the acquisition and green￿eld
decisions were assumed to take place simultaneously. To see this, note that as long as the
domestic assets are scarce and their use by an MNE shifts pro￿ts from green￿eld investors to
the acquiring MNE, vmm might be higher than vmd and vd and thus, the domestic assets will be
sold at the price vmm. It can also be shown that the acquisition price will still be higher, and
possibly substantially higher, than the domestic ￿rm￿ s reservation price, also in an environment
with asymmetric ￿rms.
17It follows directly from the set-up that the amount of aggregate investment in the
market might, indeed, be lower under the non-discriminatory policy, due to the acquisition
of the domestic ￿rm. However, it can also be shown that for the acquisition to take place,
the MNEs must be su¢ ciently e¢ cient when using the domestic assets. To see this, note










since vmm increases through the asset complementarity e⁄ect, as well as through the the
preemption e⁄ect, whereas vmd only increases through the asset complementarity e⁄ect.
Thus, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. There exists a unique ￿T de￿ned from vmd(￿T;￿) = vd and a unique ￿P de￿ned
from vmm(￿P;￿) = vd.
We can then derive the following proposition.20
Proposition 2. Assume that Assumption A1 holds. Then, (i) if ￿ < min(￿T;￿P) the EOS
is K(d), (ii) If ￿ > min(￿T;￿P), there are two subcases:. (a) ￿T < ￿P. For ￿ 2 [￿T;￿P)
the EOS is K(m) with S￿ = vd, whereas for ￿ ￿ ￿P the EOS is K(m) with S￿ = vmm. (b)
￿T > ￿P. For ￿ 2 [￿P;￿T) the EOS is either K(m) with S￿ = vmm or K(d), whereas for
￿ ￿ ￿T the EOS is K(m) with S￿ = vmm.
Proof: Consider inequalities I1-I6 in table 3.1 and note that Assumption A1 implies
that vmd and vmm increase in ￿ and vd is independent of ￿. Case (i): From Lemma 2, it
follows that if ￿ < min(￿T;￿P) then I5 or I6 holds. Case (ii): For subcase (a), Lemma 2
implies that I4 arise for ￿ 2 [￿T;￿P) and that I1 or I3 arise for ￿ ￿ ￿P. For subcase (b),
Lemma 2 implies that I2 arise for ￿ 2 [￿P;￿T) and ￿ > ￿T I1 or I3 arise. QED.
20It should be noted that in the proof of the is proposition it is presumed that the equilibrium selection
in I2 is not a⁄ected by level of ￿. If the equilibrium selection was such that foreign acquisitions was the
selected equilibrium for low values of ￿ in I2 and no acquisitions the selected equilibrium for high levels
of ￿ in I2, our results would not hold.
18This implies that there is a counteracting e⁄ect to the concentration e⁄ect (the domes-
tic ￿rm being bought out), which tends to decrease total capital in the industry, namely,
an investment e¢ ciency e⁄ect which tends to increase the total capital in the industry
through a more e¢ cient use of domestic assets, as well as through sequential investments
in new assets. To see this, let K(m) denote the aggregate level of capital when an MNE
obtains the domestic asset under the ND-policy, and let K(d) denote the aggregate level
of capital under domestic ownership under the D-policy: We then have:











which shows the di⁄erence in e⁄ective size of existing assets and the di⁄erence in aggregate
investments in new assets under the two policies. Making use of the symmetry among
MNEs, we can decompose (4.5):
K(m) ￿ K(d) =
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)￿ k + ￿A(m) ￿ ￿d(d)
￿
￿ ￿G(m) + M [￿G(m) ￿ ￿G(d)]: (4.6)
There are three e⁄ects in (4.6): The ￿rst term is once more a transaction e¢ ciency e⁄ect.
It includes a direct e⁄ect when the existing domestic assets ￿ k are placed under MNE
ownership, (￿ ￿ 1)￿ k, but it also includes an indirect e⁄ect, ￿A(m) ￿ ￿d(d), which tracks
the change in investment in new assets ￿i, due to this change in ownership of ￿ k. The
second term is the concentration e⁄ect, since one less MNE is investing green￿eld under a
foreign acquisition, ￿￿G(m). Finally, M [￿G(m) ￿ ￿G(d)], is the preemption e⁄ect on the
investment behavior of the non-acquiring MNEs, due to the change in ownership of ￿ k .
In the model presented above, it is not possible to derive any unambiguous results
on the total e⁄ect on dynamic investments and aggregate capital levels of a change in
ownership. Thus, to address the second issue in this paper in more detail, i.e. the concern
that cross-border M&As, in contrast to green￿eld FDI, do not increase the productive
capacity in the country, we need to use a more speci￿c model, which is done in the next
section.
194.3. The Linear-Quadratic Model
To examine the e⁄ects of foreign acquisition on the investment pattern in more detail,
we will apply a Linear-Quadratic model where we can capture that di⁄erent types of
investment have di⁄erent e⁄ects on ￿rms￿production costs, which allows to us derive
explicit solutions for the optimal behavior by ￿rms in all stages of the game.21
We model the oligopoly interaction in period three as Cournot competition in ho-
mogenous goods. Investments in new assets in period two (which we may consider as
investments in new capital or R&D) reduce the ￿rm￿ s marginal cost. The pro￿t for ￿rm i
can be written (for brevity, omitting function arguments on the right-hand side):





where we assume costs to be quadratic in new assets, ￿i, which we henceforth refer to as
new capital. Investments in new capital reduce a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost in a linear fashion:
ci = ￿ ci ￿ ￿￿i; (4.8)
where ￿ is a positive constant measuring how e⁄ectively investments in new capital ￿i
in stage two reduces the marginal cost. For simplicity, we assume that all ￿rms share
the same investment technology, ￿ and ￿. Asymmetries between ￿rms are captured by
the intercept term, ￿ ci, which measures the impact on ￿rm i￿ s absolute e¢ ciency level of
the possession of all other assets (such as ￿rm-speci￿c assets or acquired assets) prior to
investment in new assets, ￿i, in stage 2.22
21 This type of framework, typically modelling an investment game followed by a stage with
oligopoly interaction, has been applied in, for example, d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
Leahy and Neary (1997) and Neary (2002). A central di⁄erence between the latter two papers
and our study, is that our application examines the e⁄ects of adding an acquisition game to the
third-stage oligopoly- and the second-stage investment interaction.
22 Assuming that asymmetries between ￿rms enter through the intercept term ￿ ci in the marginal
cost ci = ￿ ci ￿ ￿￿i simpli￿es the calculations. Alternatively, we could assume that ￿rms di⁄er
in their investment costs for new investments (￿i), or in how e¢ ciently marginal costs can be
reduced by new investments (￿i). Qualitatively, this yields similar results.
20Making a distinction between ￿rm-types, we have:
￿ cG = c; ￿ cA = c + ~ cA ￿ ￿￿ k; ￿ cd = c + ~ cd ￿ ￿ k: (4.9)
Hence, we assume existing assets ￿ k and new assets ￿i to be imperfect substitutes. An
acquisition of ￿ k may, for instance, provide knowledge of the market, or provide access to
an existing distribution network, thereby providing assets distinct from new investments ￿i,
which provide a capacity to produce. This is modelled by assuming that gaining possession
of the domestic assets ￿ k in stage one alters the intercept term ￿ ci in (4.8). This is captured
by the term ￿￿ k in (4.9), where the complementarity parameter ￿ shows that the e¢ ciency
advantages may be larger under MNE ownership (by adding MNEs￿￿rm-speci￿c assets to
domestic assets ￿ k). However, utilizing older existing assets ￿ k might also imply less e¢ cient
production, as compared to solely investing in new assets (i.e. green￿eld entry). This is
captured by the term ~ cA ￿ 0.23 Similarly, we capture cost asymmetries between MNEs
and the domestic ￿rm by including ~ cd ￿ 0 in the domestic ￿rm￿ s intercept term ￿ cd.
In (4.7), the inverse demand in the product market is given by (4.10):






where a > 0 is a demand parameter, s may be interpreted as the size of the market, N is
the total number of ￿rms on the market, i.e. N(m) = M and N(d) = M +1 and qi is the
quantity supplied by ￿rm i.
The game is solved backwards. In period one, ￿rm i maximizes the variable pro￿ts
(P ￿ ci)qi such that (4.11) holds:
@￿i(￿;l)
@qi
= P ￿ ci ￿ qi = 0: (4.11)
23 To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that the acquiring MNE will always use its
acquired capital in equilibrium. For instance, we could consider this as an acquisition implying a
certain location from which relocation is costly. However, while simplifying the exposition, this
assumption is not crucial for our results.
21In period two, ￿rm i invests in new capital, ￿i, taking the optimal quantities q￿(￿;l)














where the ￿rst term is the direct e⁄ect,
@￿i
@￿i = ￿qi ￿ ￿￿i, whereas the second e⁄ect is the
strategic e⁄ect, since an increase in ￿i a⁄ects a rival￿ s output choice,
dqj
d￿i, which, in turn,
a⁄ects ￿rm i:s pro￿ts,
@￿i
@qj. From (4.11), it can be shown that
dqj
d￿i = ￿ s￿
N+1 and from
















where we may note the departure from pure cost-minimizing investment captured by the
term 2N
N+1 > 1.24 From (4.10), (4.11) and (4.13), we can solve the Nash-equilibrium in new
investments ￿￿(l) and its associated Nash-equilibrium in quantities x￿(l), and then form
the reduced-form pro￿ts for each type of ￿rm ￿h(l), h = fA;G;Dg, which are given in
table A.1 in the Appendix. The reduced form pro￿ts ￿h(l), can be inserted into valuations
(2.5)-(2.7) to solve the acquisition game in period one, and determine the equilibrium
ownership, l￿. Finally, it will be convenient to de￿ne the exogenous variable ￿ ￿ s￿2
￿
measuring the return to investment in capital in the industry.
4.3.1. Dynamic Investment e⁄ects of Cross-border acquisitions
To examine the impact of cross-border acquisition on aggregate dynamic investments, it
is instructive to examine the investment game in period two, using the familiar framework
with reaction functions in the ￿G-￿A space, assuming two MNEs, M = 2. This is done in
Figure 4.1, where Rh(￿G) is the reaction function of the acquirer (h = A) and the green￿eld
entrant (h = G), respectively. To illustrate the e⁄ects of increasing the complementarity
between domestic and foreign assets, we write reaction functions Rh(￿) and isopro￿t-curves
24 Note also that investments ￿i do not go to zero when the number of ￿rms on the market






































Figure 4.1: Examining optimal new investments for M = 2 under foreign acquisition.
￿ ￿h(￿) as dependent on the complementarity parameter ￿, omitting other arguments. Point
E then represents the Nash-equilibrium in the investment game giving rise to investments,
￿￿
h(￿).
First, note that an increase in complementarity from ￿ to ￿0 shifts RA(￿) out to RA(￿0),
whereas the reaction function of the non-acquiring green￿eld entrant moves inwards from
RG(￿) to RG(￿0): This occurs because acquiring complementary assets buys commitment
to larger investments in new capital, since the absolute e¢ ciency of the ￿rm increases
and ￿ cA in (4.9) is reduced.25 Hence, shifting the equilibrium from E to E0, the acquirer
25 From (4.8), (4.9) and (4.12), the marginal revenue of new investments is MR￿A = 3
2￿qA
which is increasing in ￿, since from (4.11), qA increases in ￿:
23increases its investments by ￿￿A = ￿￿
A(￿0) ￿ ￿￿
A(￿) > 0 (the transaction e¢ ciency e⁄ect),
whereas the corresponding decrease for the non-acquirer is ￿￿G = ￿￿
G(￿0) ￿ ￿￿
G(￿) < 0
(the preemption e⁄ect). As shown in (4.14) below, for the N-￿rm case, the reduction in
investments for non-acquirers is smaller than the increase in investments for the acquirer
and hence, sequential investments by the acquirer - as well as aggregate investments on











(1 + 2N + N2 ￿ 2N￿)
￿ k > 0; (4.14)
where 1+2N +N2￿2N￿ > 0 is required for a well-behaved equilibrium in the investment
game in stage two.
Second, from inspecting the shift of the iso-pro￿ts curves, the MNEs￿valuation of the
domestic assets vmm also increases, as the acquirer￿ s pro￿t increases by ￿￿A = ￿ ￿A(￿0) ￿
￿ ￿A(￿) > 0 (the asset complementarity e⁄ect), whereas the non-acquirer￿ s pro￿t decreases
by ￿￿G = ￿ ￿G(￿0) ￿ ￿ ￿G(￿) < 0 (the preemption e⁄ect). Since an MNEs￿valuation of the
domestic assets vmd only increases by ￿￿A; which is less than the increase in vmm, and
vd is not a⁄ected, Figure 4.1 also illustrates Proposition 2, thereby implying that foreign
acquisitions tend to occur when the complementarity between MNEs ￿rm-speci￿c assets
and the domestic asset ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
From (4.4), (4.5) and (4.14), we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In the Linear-Quadratic Model: (i) foreign acquisitions occur when the
complementarity between the domestic assets and the MNE￿ s ￿rm-speci￿c assets ￿ is
su¢ ciently large. (ii) The amount of sequential investments in new assets by the acquirer,
as well as aggregate investments in new assets, increase in the complementarity parameter
￿.
4.3.2. Welfare and investments
Having examined the e⁄ects on aggregate investments of cross-border acquisition, we will
now turn to the implications for welfare. The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As
24and market structures in an international oligopoly is typically made by comparing the
sum of domestic consumer surplus and domestic pro￿ts in di⁄erent market structures.
Here, we follow this approach, but add the sales price of ￿rm d￿ s assets in the domestic
welfare measure, when the domestic assets are sold. It follows that the ND- and D-
policies only di⁄er when an MNE acquires the domestic assets ￿ k under the ND-policy,
i.e. whenever one of the inequalities I1 ￿ I4 holds. Once more, let WND = W(m) denote
the welfare level when an MNE obtains the domestic asset under the ND-policy, and let
WD = W(d) denote the welfare level under the D-policy: De￿ning the di⁄erence in welfare
WND￿D = W(m) ￿ W(d), and rearranging terms, we obtain:
WND￿D = [A ￿ ￿d(d)] + [CS(m) ￿ CS(d)], (4.15)
where A is the acquisition price of assets ￿ k, ￿d(d) is the domestic ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, CS(d) the
consumer surplus under domestic ownership of ￿ k, and CS(m) the consumer surplus under
foreign ownership of ￿ k. The ￿rst term in (4.15) captures the di⁄erence in producer surplus
and the second term captures the di⁄erence in consumer surplus between the two policies.
In Figure 4.2(i) and (iv), we illustrate how the relationship between cross-border ac-
quisitions and aggregate investments in new capital depends on the complementarity pa-
rameter ￿ and the variable ￿ ￿ s￿2
￿ measuring the return to investment in capital in the
industry. We may note that acquisitions ￿rst occur at the reservations price A = vd. In
such cases, MNEs have roughly the same ability in using the domestic ￿rm￿assets ￿ k (i.e.
￿ ￿ 1) and foreign acquisitions mainly occur for anti-competitive reasons. However, con-
sistent with Proposition 3, Figure 4.2(i) also shows that the bidding competition among
MNEs to gain the advantage of being the acquirer (the asset complementarity e⁄ect) and
also avoiding the disadvantage of being the non-acquirer (the preemption e⁄ect), ensures
that foreign acquisitions start emerging when the MNEs are more e¢ cient in using the
domestic assets ￿ k and that increases in complementarity ￿ (and, to some lesser extent,
increases in the return to investment, ￿) quickly bid up the acquisition price to A = vmm.
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Figure 4.2: Examing the welfare e⁄ects of a cross-border acquisition in the Linear
Quadratic Model, when varying the complementarity ￿ and return to investments ￿ ￿ s￿2
￿ .
Other parameters set at ￿ = 5, s = 5, M = 4, ￿ k = 1, ~ cA = 0:5 and ~ cd = 0:8.
26are su¢ ciently more e¢ cient and the return to new investments is su¢ ciently high, aggre-
gate investment into new capital is larger under the non-discriminatory policy. We may,
however, note that the latter region is limited in size, due to the concentration e⁄ect noted
in (4.6).
Next, we turn to consumer e⁄ects. To evaluate how investments a⁄ect consumer wel-
fare, we need to take into account how aggregate capital changes with ownership, i.e. we
need to account for both the direct e¢ ciency e⁄ect on domestic assets (the ￿rst term in
(4.5)), as well as the indirect e⁄ect on new investments (the second term in (4.5)), since
both e⁄ects will a⁄ect ￿rms￿output choices. Once more, consistent with Proposition 3,
Figure 4.2(ii) shows the region where consumers gain from the non-discriminatory pol-
icy to be conducive to high levels of complementarities and high returns to investments.
This said, at low levels of complementarity low returns to investments, we may note that
anti-competitive foreign acquisitions occur, thereby hurting consumers. Finally, consid-
ering total welfare and adding the acquisition price to the consumer surplus, there is an
increase in the region where non-discriminatory policy is preferred. The reason is that,
in equilibrium, and as shown in proposition 1, the producer surplus is always higher or
substantially higher under the non-discriminatory policy. To summarize
Proposition 4. In the Linear-Quadratic Model: (i) restricting cross-border acquisitions
will reduce the domestic producer surplus and the consumer surplus when ￿ and ￿ are
su¢ ciently high, since cross-border acquisitions lead to a more e¢ cient use of existing
capital as well as sequential new investments. (ii) restricting cross-border acquisitions
will increase the domestic consumer surplus when ￿ and ￿ are su¢ ciently low, since cross-
border acquisitions lead to a lower level of new investments and increase the concentration.
Consequently, we demonstrate that asset complementarities in acquisitions and the
associated dynamic investment e⁄ects are important for determining the welfare e⁄ects of
cross-border M&As.
275. Extensions
In order to illuminate the mechanisms identi￿ed in a simple way we have abstracted from
several potentially important aspects of FDI for the host country. Below we address some
of these issues, namely, e⁄ects of endogenous entry and exit and e⁄ects of having more
domestic ￿rms in the host market.
5.1. Entry and exit
So far in the analysis, we have assumed that all M MNEs invest. If complementarities
create a strong acquirer, green￿eld entry may be reduced, however. We will here explore
entry e⁄ects in the Linear-Quadratic Model. To this end, we assume that green￿eld entry
takes place until the last ￿rm cannot cover its investment costs, that is, the total number
of ￿rms on the market N must ful￿ll ￿G(N(l)) > G and ￿G(N(l)+1) ￿ G, where G is the
￿xed cost of entry in addition to the investments costs in period two, and where reduced-
form pro￿t indicates the number of ￿rms in the market. The probability of successful






M￿1 if l = m
N(d)￿1
M if l = d:
(5.1)
An MNE￿ s probability of green￿eld entry may not be the same under a di⁄erent ownership
of the domestic assets: First, the number of MNEs competing for green￿eld entry is
di⁄erent. In addition, the number of pro￿table green￿eld entrants (N(l)￿1) may not be the
same. Introducing uncertainty in green￿eld entry, we then need to adjust ￿rms￿valuations
of the domestic assets. These valuations now become vmm = ￿A(m) ￿ p(m)[￿G(m) ￿ G],
vmd = ￿A(m) ￿ p(d)[￿G(d) ￿ G] and, ￿nally, vd = ￿d(d), where we have omitted the
number of ￿rms as an argument.
The results presented in Figure 5.1 are qualitatively very similar to the previous results
obtained in Figure 4.2. In Figure 5.1(i), we see that competition for the market (i.e. entry)
further increases the bidding competition among MNEs, which tends to increase the region
28where the acquisition price is A = vmm.
In Figure 5.1(ii), the consumer surplus e⁄ects of the di⁄erent policies are depicted.
For a given equilibrium number of entrants, consumers gain from foreign ownership of
the domestic assets when the complementarity ￿ and the return to investments ￿ are
su¢ ciently high. However, more e¢ cient acquisitions (larger ￿) can also lead to fewer
MNEs entering green￿eld, as illustrated in Figure 5.1(iv), thereby reducing the consumer
surplus. Consumers could then be better or worse o⁄ under a non-discriminatory policy,
depending on the details in the ￿rm and product market characteristics.
Considering total welfare, adding the acquisition price to the consumer surplus, Figure
5.1(iii) shows that the region where the discriminatory policy is preferred now becomes
much smaller. The reason is, once more, that the producer surplus is always higher or
substantially higher under the non-discriminatory policy, where this e⁄ect is reinforced
when MNEs also bid for safe entry into the market.
Forbidding cross-border acquisition may also cause an exit of the domestic ￿rm as
shown in the following proposition
Proposition 5. Under the discriminatory policy, the domestic ￿rm exits if the return to







Hence, it is shown that under the discriminatory policy, the domestic ￿rm might be
forced out of the market due to competition from the potentially more e¢ cient green￿eld
entering MNEs. However, the domestic assets might be valuable for the MNEs and a cross-
border M&A would take place if allowed. Consequently, a restrictive cross-border M&A
policy might cause the exit of domestic producers, and an exit without any compensation.
In conclusion, our main ￿nding that producer surplus and total surplus tend to be
higher under the non-discriminatory policy also holds when entry is endogenous. However,
the e⁄ects on consumers are more involved when endogenizing entry.
29A = vmm CS￿d￿ > CS￿m￿ A = vd A = vd CS￿d￿ < CS￿m￿
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Figure 5.1: Welfare e⁄ects of cross-border acquisition in the Linear Quadratic Model under
endogenous entry, when varying complementarity ￿ and return to investments ￿ ￿ s￿2
￿ .
Other parameters set at ￿ = 5, s = 5, M = 5, ￿ k = 1, ~ cA = 0:5, ~ cd = 0:8 and G = 5.
305.2. More domestic ￿rms
We have restricted the analysis to have only one domestic ￿rm. Extending our analysis
to more domestic ￿rms give rise to at least two new important aspects for the question
addressed here, namely, (i) externalities (positive or negative ) on non-selling domestic
￿rms and (ii) the ￿ bargaining position￿of the selling domestic ￿rm.
Let us start with the e⁄ects on the non-selling domestic ￿rms pro￿ts. To this end we
now assume that we have several other domestic ￿rms in the market. They are assumed
not to be for sale. An e¢ ciency enhancing acquisition might then reduce these ￿rms pro￿ts
and might thus imply that the domestic producer surplus fall under a non-discriminatory
policy. However, it can be shown in a version of the Linear-Quadratic Model with more
than one domestic ￿rm that the selling premium dominates this e⁄ect for many parameter
values.26
Let us now turn to the e⁄ect on the ￿ bargaining position of the selling domestic ￿rm. A
crucial assumption is that the domestic assets are unique, i.e. there are no other domestic
￿rms. Will the results in the paper hold if this assumption is relaxed? Our analysis seems
valid for situations where the domestic assets are su¢ ciently scarce. For instance, the
results derived here would hold if we had a smaller number of domestic ￿rms, denoted
D, than MNEs, denoted M, and each of the domestic ￿rm￿ s assets were auctioned out
sequentially, and assuming that it would be pro￿table for an MNE to buy one domestic
asset only. The analysis presented above would then apply when the assets of the last
domestic ￿rm are sold out, etc.
If there were more domestic ￿rms than MNEs, the situation might be di⁄erent. Assume
that a domestic ￿rm cannot make positive pro￿ts when the MNEs have entered. Then, in
the last period, if there are two domestic ￿rms left, the remaining MNE could play them
out against each other, buying the assets at a price close to zero. In the second last period,
the price will be determined in the same fashion and hence, the acquisition price for any
26Proofs are available upon request.
31of the assets will be close to zero. Thus the scarcity of the domestic assets are crucial for
our result on domestic seller premium.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that investment liberalizing countries might forego the pos-
sibility of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that would signi￿cantly increase welfare when
having restrictions on cross-border M&As. The ￿rst reason is that combining multinational
enterprises￿(MNEs￿ ) strong ￿rm-speci￿c assets with domestic ￿rms￿important country-
speci￿c assets would mean a possibility of creating a surplus for the ￿rms involved. If the
domestic assets provide the acquirer with a strong position in the host market relative to
other MNEs, MNEs gain from preventing other MNEs from obtaining the assets, thereby
further increasing the surplus. Then, we have shown that if domestic assets are su¢ ciently
scarce, the selling domestic ￿rm will capture the created surplus. The second reason is
that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be su¢ ciently e¢ cient when using
the domestic assets and invest su¢ ciently sequentially. This implies that the amount of
productive capacity in the market, and thereby the consumer surplus, will be higher under
the non-discriminatory policy in many situations.
These ￿ndings suggest that competition policy, but not a discriminatory policy to-
wards foreigners, might play an important role in liberalized markets. Moreover, it seems
important that the authority ensures that there is competition for entering the liberalized
markets, both as acquirers and green￿eld entrants. Consequently, measures to reduce
the pre-investment cost for owners contemplating investment in the liberalized market in
general seem warranted.
To empirically determine when there is scarcity on the seller side when countries in-
vestment liberalize is crucial for the selling surplus e⁄ect identi￿ed in this paper. An
indication of the mechanisms identi￿ed here being empirically relevant could be found in
the empirical event study literature on M&A performance. There, it is found that target
32share holders bene￿t from a merger, whereas the bidding ￿rms￿share holders generally
break even (see Scherer and Ross, 1990).
A. Appendix:
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that bi ￿ maxvml; l = fd;mg is a weakly dominated strategy, since no MNE
will post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and that
￿rm d will accept a bid in stage 2, i⁄ bi > vd.
Inequality I1 Consider the equilibrium candidate b￿ = (b￿
1;b￿
2;:::;yes). Let us assume
that MNE w 6= d is the MNE that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets and
￿rm s 6= d the MNE with the second highest bid.
Then, b￿
w ￿ vmm is a weakly dominated strategy. b￿
w < vmm ￿ " is not an equilibrium,
since ￿rm j 6= w;d then bene￿ts from deviating to bj = b￿
w + "; since it will then obtain
the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b￿
w = vmm ￿ ",
and b￿
s 2 [vmm ￿ ";vmm ￿ 2"], then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to
no, ￿rm d￿ s payo⁄ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd.
Accordingly, ￿rm d has no incentive to deviate and thus, b￿ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1;;;bm;no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let MNE h be the MNE with the highest
bid. Firm d will then say no i⁄bh ￿ vd. But MNE j 6= d will have the incentive to deviate
to b0 = vd + " in period 1, since vmd > vd. This contradicts the assumption that b is a
Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider the equilibrium candidate b￿ = (b￿
1;b￿
2;:::;y). Then, b￿
w ￿ vij is
a weakly dominated strategy. b￿
w < vij ￿ " is not an equilibrium since ￿rm j 6= w;d then
bene￿ts from deviating to bj = b￿
w + "; since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b￿
w = vmm ￿", and b￿
s 2 [vmm ￿";vmm ￿2"],
33then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ￿rm d￿ s payo⁄ decreases
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd. Accordingly, ￿rm d has no
incentive to deviate and thus, b￿ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate b￿￿ = (b￿￿
1 ;b￿￿
2 ;:::;no): Then, b￿
w ￿ vd is not an
equilibrium since ￿rm d would then bene￿t by deviating to yes. If b￿
w < vd, then no MNE
has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, ￿rm d￿ s payo⁄ decreases since it then
sells its assets at a price below its valuation, vd. Firm d has no incentive to deviate and
thus, b￿￿ is a Nash equilibrium.




is a weakly dominated strategy. b￿
w < vmm￿" is not an equilibrium since ￿rm j 6= w;d then
bene￿ts from deviating to bj = b￿
w + "; since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b￿
w = vmm ￿", and b￿
s 2 [vmm ￿";vmm ￿2"],
then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ￿rm d￿ s payo⁄ decreases,
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation vd. Accordingly, ￿rm d has no
incentive to deviate and thus, b￿ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1;:::;bM;no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no i⁄ bh ￿ vd.
But MNE j 6= d will then have the incentive to deviate to b0 = vd + " in stage 1, since
vmd > vd. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




is not an equilibrium since ￿rm w would then bene￿t from deviating to bw = vd. b￿
w < vd
is not an equilibrium, since ￿rm d would then not accept any bid. If b￿
w = vd￿", then ￿rm
w has no incentive to deviate: By deviating to b0
j ￿ b￿
w, ￿rm j￿ s, j 6= w;d, payo⁄ does not
change. By deviating to b0
j > b￿
w; ￿rm j￿ s payo⁄ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay vmm. Accordingly, ￿rm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ￿rm d￿ s payo⁄ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation vd.
Accordingly, ￿rm d has no incentive to deviate and thus, b￿ is a Nash equilibrium.
34Let b = (b1;;;bm;yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ￿ vmm, then ￿rm w will have the
incentive to deviate to b0 = bw ￿ ". If bw < vmm, then ￿rm d will have the incentive to
deviate to no, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1;:::;bm;no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no i⁄bh ￿ vd. But
MNE j 6= d will have the incentive to deviate to b0 = vd + " in stage 1 since vmd > vd,
which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




i < vd 8i 2 M: It then follows directly that no ￿rm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
b￿ is a Nash equilibrium.
Then, note that ￿rm d will accept a bid i⁄bi ￿ vd: But bi ￿ vd is a weakly dominating
bid in these intervals, since vd > maxfvmm;vmdg: Thus, the assets will not be sold in these
intervals.
A.2. The Linear Quadratic Model
Quantities and pro￿ts (as a function of the ownership of the domestic assets, l) in the
Linear Quadratic Model are given in table A.1, below.
35Table A.1: Optimal quantities as functions of ownership structure.
Domestic ownership Foreign ownership





























Note: ￿ ￿ s￿2
￿ , ￿ ￿ a ￿ c, ^ cA ￿ ~ cA ￿ ￿ ￿ k, ^ cd ￿ ~ cd ￿ ￿ k
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